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Extreme Departure: Not So Extreme in the Public Offering Context
Nicolette Fata*
I.

Introduction

On October 1, 2014, Robby Shawn Stadnick and numerous others purchased shares of
Vivint Solar—a solar energy company with a lucrative business model—helping it raise more than
$300 million in proceeds. 1 Any reasonable investor would have expected his or her newlypurchased shares to, at minimum, hold their value over time, but, in the ideal, increase in value so
as to turn a substantial profit. This, however, was not the case for Stadnick and others who
purchased the 20,600,000 shares of Vivint Solar’s common stock that first Wednesday in October
2014.2
Much thought surrounds the valuation of shares in anticipation of a public offering.3 So
when the price of Vivint Solar’s shares quickly dropped by more than 22%,4 a reasonable investor,
such as Stadnick, would have justifiably been upset and concerned. A reasonable investor would
presumably have read the prospectus and registration statement of any company in which he or
she was planning to invest, becoming intimately familiar with the company’s business model and
financials and confirming that the stock valuation was reasonable and the shares were worth
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Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 1, Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc., Nos. 14-9283, 14-9709 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), 2015
WL 8492757 [hereinafter Second Amended Complaint].
2
Id. at ¶ 1.
3
Shayndi
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Art
of
the
IPO,
WALL
STREET
J.
(Nov.
12,
2012),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203922804578080763596406112 (noting that “[i]t’s a fine line.
Price your shares too high, and you’ll collect a lot of money. But the subsequent drop may alienate investors and
demoralize your employees. Price them too low and you’ll grab plenty of headlines as your stock soars on takeoff,
but you’ve failed to raise nearly as much as you could have, and the initial buying frenzy may end up costing you
some long-term investors.”).
4
Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1.
1
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purchasing. 5 A collective shareholder loss of $60 million is likely to shock an investor like
Stadnick.6
In the case of Vivint Solar, an investor, such as Stadnick, may not have predicted such a
loss based on a normal reading of the prospectus and registration statement. This is because the
loss that Stadnick and other like-investors suffered was the result of a conveniently-timed public
offering, taking place almost immediately prior to Vivint Solar’s release of its third quarter
financial statements, which would show a dismal performance far greater than what a number of
investors would have forecasted.7 An outcome of the sort that Stadnick and other Vivint Solar
investors experienced begs the court for intervention. Yet, for an issuing entity, it can be difficult
to predict when it is necessary to disclose interim financial statements in anticipation of a public
offering, as the circuits are split on the appropriate test for making that determination: the total mix
test8 or the extreme departure test.9 This Comment will argue that the correct test courts should
apply is the extreme departure test, expressed in Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp.10
Both the total mix test and the extreme departure test are fairly straightforward and can be
summarized somewhat simply. The total mix test seeks to determine “whether there is ‘a
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted [interim financial statements] would have
been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the “total mix” of
information made available.’”11 The extreme departure test, on the other hand, asks whether the

5

For an analysis on the reasonable investor and what is normally expected of him or her, see Tom C.W. Lin,
Reasonable Investor(s), 95 B.U. L. REV. 461 (2015).
6
Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 1.
7
Id.
8
The total mix test is commonly known as the materiality test. Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc., 861 F.3d 31, 36 (2d
Cir. 2017)
9
Compare Id. (applying the total mix test), with Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194 (1st Cir. 1996) (applying
the extreme departure test).
10
Shaw, 82 F.3d. at 1210.
11
Id. at 37 (quoting DeMaria v. DeMaria, 318 F.3d 170, 180 (2d Cir. 2003)).
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issuing entity was “in possession of nonpublic information indicating that the quarter in progress
at the time of the public offering will be an extreme departure from the range of results which
could be anticipated based on currently available information” in determining whether section 11
liability is warranted due to the omission of interim financial statements within a prospectus,
registration statement, etc.12
This Comment will examine the peculiar and significant context of a public offering in
determining whether courts considering section 11 liability should apply the total mix or extreme
departure test for determining the materiality of omitting interim financial statements. Part II of
this Comment will provide the necessary background concerning section 11 of the Securities Act
of 1933.13 Part III will present an overview of Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc. and Shaw v. Digital
Equipment Corp. and the two different materiality tests that they applied, which created a circuit
split (Circuit Split). It will also argue that the extreme departure test should be the applicable test
for determining materiality for purposes of section 11 liability. Part IV will examine the policy
implications underlining both tests. Part V will argue that, moving forward, circuits should apply
the extreme departure test because (1) it best accommodates the expectations of actual, rather than
reasonable, investors; (2) it best fits with the existence of the insider-trading disclose or abstain
rule; and (3) it best reconciles the need for a fiduciary duty in the context of insider trading with
the nonexistence of such in a public offering. Part V will also examine the remaining issues to be
resolved in implementing the extreme departure test and concludes.
II.

12
13

Intra-Quarterly Disclosures, Section 11, and the Securities Act of 1933: When is
Disclosure Required?

Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1210. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012).
15 U.S.C. § 77k.

3

Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 (‘33 Act), which governs the initial offering
of securities, with the primary objectives of (1) ensuring that potential investors receive significant
information—financial and otherwise relevant—regarding the securities to be sold in a public
offering, and (2) eliminating all forms of fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation in connection with
such offerings.14 To these ends, the ‘33 Act requires issuing entities to register their securities
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); the provisions also generally require an
issuer to disclose a description of its properties and business and the security to be offered,
information concerning its management structure, and independently certified financial
statements.15 As such, the registration requirement seeks to efficiently provide potential investors
with a complete and accurate impression of the security to be offered.16
Significantly, however, the SEC does not guarantee that the information issuing entities
provide in their registration statements is, in fact, accurate. 17 Instead, the ‘33 Act provides
investors with a private action to enforce section 11 for material misrepresentations and omissions
in the registration statement, among other things.18
Under section 11 of the ‘33 Act, issuing entities have a duty to disclose material
information to potential investors in anticipation of a public offering.19 And, they may be liable
for registration statements containing “an untrue statement of a material fact [or] omit[ting] to state
a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not

The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/answers/aboutlawsshtml.html (last visited April 19, 2018)(explaining that the ‘33 Act, “[o]ften referred to as the ‘truth in securities’
law . . . has two basic objectives: [to] require that investors receive financial and other significant information
concerning securities being offered for public sale; and [to] prohibit deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud in the
sale of securities.”).
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 77k.
19
15 U.S.C. § 77k.
14
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misleading[.]”20 An investor who bought shares—either at the time of a public offering or at a
time reasonably related in time and reliance to the public offering—may bring a civil suit against
the issuing entity for violating section 11 by omitting statements which would have been otherwise
necessary to make the registration statement complete and not materially misleading.21
Inherent in the federal securities law, however, is the notion that silence on the part of an
issuing entity cannot be actionable when the issuer has no duty to disclose.22 Significant to the
issue analyzed herein is the fact that “the mere possession of material nonpublic information does
not create a duty to disclose it.”23 The context of a public offering, however, creates “a strong
affirmative duty of disclosure” on the part of the issuer,24 generating some confusion for an issuer
regarding what exactly its obligations are.
Issuing entities can turn to case law for some guidance as to the types of information that
must be disclosed.25 Clearly, silence where there is no duty to disclose is not actionable.26 But if
an issuing entity does choose to disclose information though it has no legal duty to do so, the
disclosure must be truthful and non-misleading.27
Section 11 liability often arises out of an issuing entity’s failure to disclose information
required under Items 303 or 503:28 Item 303 requires issuing entities to provide forward-looking

20

Id.
Legal Information Institute, Securities Act of 1933, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/securities_act_of_1933 (last
visited April 19, 2018).
22
Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1202 (1st Cir. 1996).
23
Id. (citing Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 1987).
24
Id. (citing Ernst & Young v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976)).
25
See J & R Marketing, SEP v. Gen. Motors Corp., 549 F.3d 384, 398 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77k(a),
77l(a)(2) (2012); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988); Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 639 (6th Cir.
1993)).
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
BRENT A. OLSON, PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS HANDBOOK §5:101 (2017-2 ed.).
21
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projections concerning any information that they possess;29 Item 503 requires issuing entities to
disclose the most significant factors that potentially render the offering risky. 30
Under Item 303, an issuer must disclose any information “that significantly or materially
decreases the predictive value of [its] reported results.”31 An issuing entity’s internal forecasts are
not considered to be material information giving rise to a duty to disclose.32 Such disclosure is not
required because of the SEC’s apprehension that investors may misinterpret such information.33
There are certain events, courts have noted, that would require an issuing entity to provide
intra-quarter updates, however. 34 “[M]aterial forward-looking information regarding known
material trends and uncertainties [must be] disclosed as part of the required discussion of those
matters and the analysis of their effects.” 35 Courts consider statements or omissions material
where a reasonable investor would have considered such information in making a significant
investment decision.36 The exact test for materiality, as has been presented and will further be
discussed in Part III, differs amongst circuits. 37 A duty to disclose, however, arises when an
issuing entity’s financial predictions based on interim financial data “cease to be optical forecasts

29

J & R Marketing, SEP, 549 F.3d at 392.
City of Roseville Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. EnergySolutions, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 2d 395, 426 n.34 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing
17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (2011)).
31
Oxford Asset Mgmt. Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1192 (11th Cir. 2002); Slater v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.,
719 F.3d 1190, 1197–1203 (10th Cir. 2013).
32
In re Facebook, Inc. IPO Sec. & Derivative Litig., 986 F. Supp. 2d 487, 506–08 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see also Glassman
v. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 631 (1st Cir. 1996) (“Plaintiffs’ nondisclosure claims fail because they base
their allegations solely on discrepancies between actual (but undisclosed) intra-quarterly information and [the issuing
entity’s] undisclosed internal projections.”); Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., Civil No. 96-1077-K, 1996 WL 881659,
at *4 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (“[Issuing entities] have no duty to disclose intraquarter results, even if those results are lower
than the company’s internal projections.”).
33
In re Facebook, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 631.
34
Id.
35
Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
Operations, Securities Act Release No. 33–8350, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,062 (Dec. 29, 2003).
36
See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 161–62 (2d Cir.
2000).
37
See, e.g., Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc., 861 F.3d 31 (2d Cir. 2017); Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194 (1st
Cir. 1996).
30
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and instead become present knowledge[.]”38 Thus, the issue that interim financial statements pose
to the inquiry discussed herein lies in the determination of whether they contain “material forwardlooking information regarding known material trends or uncertainties[].”39
III.

The Circuit Split

This Part provides an overview of Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc. and Shaw v. Digital
Equipment Corp., including the respective courts’ analysis of the relevant issues, including which
test is to be applied in determining whether to invoke section 11 liability. To reiterate, the two
tests may be summarized as follows: the total mix test looks at the information that a prospective
investor had at hand in the wake of the public offering to determine whether the quarter-end results
of the issuing entity would have been predictable by a reasonable investor given what information
was made available to them;40 The extreme departure tests looks at the information that the issuing
entity had at hand for the quarter in which the public offering took place and seeks to determine
whether that information would have indicated that the quarterly results would have been an
extreme departure from prior predictions.41
In light of the preceding discussion of the ‘33 Act and, particularly, section 11 liability, it
is relevant to turn once again to the narrative that opened this Comment. As mentioned earlier,

38

Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Securities Act Release No. 6711 52
F.R. 13715, 13717 (Apr. 24, 1987) (“Both required disclosure regarding the future impact of presently known trends,
events or uncertainties and optional forward-looking information may involve some prediction or projection. The
distinction between the two rests with the nature of the prediction required. Required disclosure is based on currently
known trends, events and uncertainties that are reasonably expected to have material effects, such as: A reduction in
the registrant’s product prices; erosion in the registrant’s market share; changes in insurance coverage; or the likely
non-renewal of a material contract. In contrast, optional forward-looking disclosure involves anticipating a future
trend or event or anticipating a less predictable impact of a known event, trend or uncertainty.”).
39
In re Facebook, Inc. IPO Sec. & Derivative Litig., 986 F. Supp. 2d 487, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
40
Stadnick, 861 F.3d at 37.
41
Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1210.
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issuing entities consider many options in valuing their impending stock issuance,42 including the
timing of the public offering.43
While most public offerings are strategically timed,44 the timing of Vivint Solar’s public
offering was particularly deceptive. Vivint Solar’s public offering took place on October 1, 2014,
just one day after the end of its third quarter.45 As such, the quarter-end financial projections
would have presumably been fairly concrete and only slightly speculative. 46 On November 10,
2014, forty days after its public offering, Vivint Solar released its financial results for the third
quarter: a decrease in the company’s net loss by $28.6 million.47 This information had not been
provided to the potential investors prior to the public offering.48 Vivint Solar’s stock thereafter
lost value; shares that had been sold at $16 per share at the public offering dropped to $11.70 per
share just forty-three days later.49
A similar situation occurred twenty-one years earlier when investors purchased the debt
and equity securities of Digital Equipment Corporation. 50 In that case, Digital Equipment
Corporation scheduled its public offering to begin just ten days before the end of its third quarter
and to close three days before the end of its third quarter. 51 Just three weeks later, Digital
Equipment Corporation released its financial statements for the third quarter, demonstrating its

42

See Raice, supra note 3.
For an overview of the factors and conditions issuing entities take into account when determining when to publically
offer shares, see Simon Benninga, et al., The Timing of Initial Public Offerings, 75 J. FIN. ECON. 115 (2005) (analyzing
“the optimal conditions for taking a company public”).
44
Tom Farley, The Right Time to IPO, NYSE, https://www.nyse.com/article/right-time-to-ipo.
45
Stadnick, 861 F.3d at 34.
46
Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 1.
47
Stadnick, 861 F.3d at 34.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Shaw, 82 F.3d.
51
Id. at 1200.
43
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largest loss in over three years.52 On that same day, its common stock value fell from $28.875 to
$21.125.53
While the course of events in Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc. and in Shaw v. Digital
Equipment Corp. were very similar, the courts in the two jurisdictions applied different tests to
determine whether the quarter-to-date financial information were material, and thus their omission
from the registration statement actionable.54 The Second Circuit in Stadnick split with the First
Circuit in Shaw on the issue of whether a failure to disclose interim financial statements may be a
material omission giving rise to section 11 liability.55
A.

Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp.
1. Factual Background
Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp. involved a dispute between preferred and common

shareholders and Digital Equipment Corporation, its Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief
Financial Officer (CFO), and seven underwriting and investment banking firms.56 The plaintiffs
sued the defendants under sections 11 and 12(2) of the ‘33 Act.57 With respect to their section 11
claims,58 plaintiffs asserted that Digital Equipment Corporation’s management was aware and in
possession of material facts relating to large-scale losses to be reported in its third quarter of fiscal
year 1994, which the plaintiffs argued created a duty to disclose in connection with the public
offering.59 Defendants responded by equating plaintiffs’ argument to an assertion that the issuer

52

Id.
Id.
54
Compare Stadnick, 861 F.3d (applying the total mix test), with Shaw, 82 F.3d (applying the extreme departure test).
55
Cole Hamilton, Second Circuit Splits with First Over Securities Disclosure Test, (June 21, 2017) N.Y.L.J.,
http://newyorklawjournal.com/this-weeks-news/id=1202790829271/Second-Circuit-Splits-With-First-OverSecurities-Disclosure-Test?mcode=1202615036097&curindex=2.
56
Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1210.
57
Id.
58
This factual overview and analysis of the court’s reasoning is limited to a review of the section 11 claim only, as
that is what is pertinent to the argument made herein.
59
Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1200.
53
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was required to release internal forecasts concerning the third quarter, and argued that such a claim
was “untenable because the securities laws impose no duty upon a[n] [issuing entity] to disclose
internal projections, estimates of quarterly results, or other forward-looking information.”60
At the time, Digital Equipment Corporation was one of the largest computer hardware,
software, and services suppliers in the world.61 Having gone public in 1966, by the early 1990’s
it was earning roughly $14 million per year in revenue. 62 In 1992, however, Digital Equipment
Corporation suffered quarterly losses of $138.3 million in January and between $30–311 million
in the succeeding months.63 The company underwent a massive overhaul of its operating and
management structure, cutting 35,000 jobs and replacing its CEO,64 and incurred restructuring
charges of approximately $3.2 billion for the years 1990–1992. 65 Notably, the company
introduced a new, revolutionary product that jumpstarted its financial growth in February 1992.66
It finally had a profitable quarter in mid-1993, announcing a net profit of $113.2 million.67 This
success was unsustainable, as the company reported a loss of $72 million for the second quarter of
1994.68
Digital Equipment Corporation thereafter filed a shelf registration with the SEC, providing
the company with the option of issuing a maximum of $1 billion in various debt classes and equity
securities.69 The company began issuing stock on March 21, 1994, and ended its sale on March
28, 1994, three days prior to the end of its third quarter.70 At an offering price of $25 per share,

60

Id. at 1202.
Id. at 1199.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1199.
66
Id. at 1200.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
61
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the sale of the entirety of Digital Equipment Corporation’s depositary shares of preferred stock
resulted in $387.4 million in proceeds for the corporation.71
Digital Equipment Corporation announced its third quarter earnings less than three weeks
after the close of its public offering.72 The reported loss was far greater than analysts’ expectations
and was, in fact, its largest reported loss since fiscal year 1993’s first quarter.73 This announcement
sent preferred stock prices plummeting from the offering price of $25 per share to $20.875 on
April 15, and common stock prices fell from a high of $28.875 to $21.125 by the next trading
day.74
2. The Court’s Reasoning
In Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp., the First Circuit analyzed whether Digital Equipment
Corporation was legally obligated to disclose, in the registration statement, the imminent report of
third quarter losses to investors.75 In sum, the First Circuit was uncertain as to the materiality of
the information that Digital Equipment Corporation had in its possession at the time of the
offering.76 Rather, it was unable to hold that Digital Equipment Corporation was not required to
disclose material information concerning its third quarter interim financial statements. 77
Ultimately, the First Circuit chose to apply the extreme departure test to the above-mentioned facts
to determine materiality because “it is consistent with the basic statutory policies favoring
disclosure to require inclusion of that information in the registration statement.”78 These statutory
policies will now be discussed.

71

Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1200.
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 1202.
76
Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1203.
77
Id.
78
Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1210.
72

11

i.

Insider Trading

In its analysis, the First Circuit first undertook an insider trading analysis to compare the
requirements of disclosure for an individual corporate insider in an insider trading case and a
corporation on the brink of a public offering.79 The court “conceptualiz[ed] [Digital Equipment
Corporation] (the corporate issuer) as an individual insider transacting in the company’s securities,
and examine[d] the disclosure obligations that would then arise.” 80 The court noted that the
“disclose or abstain” rule, frequently applied to insider trading by individuals, is also applicable to
an issuing entity trading in its own securities.81 The court expanded on this notion by saying that
a rule comparable to disclose-or-abstain should be applicable to issuing entities engaged in the
public offering of its own shares. 82 Otherwise, it noted, “a corporate issuer selling its own
securities would be left free to exploit its informational trading advantage, at the expense of
investors, by delaying disclosure of material nonpublic negative news until after completion of the
offering.”83
ii. Section 11 and SEC Policy
The court then conducted a policy analysis regarding whether strong disclosure
requirements, such as those that exist in the context of an individual corporate insider in an insider
trading case, should also exist in the context of corporate issuers.84 The civil liability imposed by

79

Id. at 1203.
Id. The First Circuit provided several justifications for analogizing individual insider trading and corporate insider
trading. Id. For more information concerning the court’s analysis, see VII LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES
REGULATION 1505 (3d ed. 1991) (“When the issuer itself wants to buy or sell its own securities, it has a choice: desist
or disclose.”); 18 DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT & PREVENTION
§3.02[1][d], at 5 (3d rel. 1994) (“Issuers themselves may buy or sell their own securities, and have long been hold to
an obligation of full disclosure . . . . Conceptually, extending the insider trading prohibition to instances of issuer
insider trading makes perfect sense.”).
81
Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1203.
82
Id. at 1204.
83
Id.
84
Id.
80
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section 11 ensures that issuing entities put forth full and complete effort in preparing their
registration statements and ensuring that all required material information.85 Particular to Shaw is
the fact that Digital Equipment Corporation prepared its public offering pursuant to SEC Form S3, which requires that the prospectus describe:
any and all material changes in the registrant’s affairs which have occurred since
the end of the latest fiscal year for which certified financial statements were
included in the latest annual report to security holders and which have not been
described in a report on Form 10-Q or Form 8-K filed under the Exchange Act.86
The court noted that the entire point of the requirement of disclosing material changes under Item
11(a) is to ensure that any and all necessary updates to the information that they were provided in
the original SEC filings and the prospectus, even those concerning “known trends and
uncertainties” concerning “net sales or revenues or income from continuing operations.”87 Given
the amount of information and the nature of such information that Digital Equipment Corporation
had at hand during the days leading up to the end of its third quarter,88 it would have likely realized
that this information would have indicated a financial performance differing from any predictions,
or at least provided the company with some uncertainty as to its financial state.
While Item 11(a) carries with it rather specific requirements, the general scheme of the
federal securities laws also provides justification for utilizing the extreme departure test.89 The
court noted that one of the primary goals of the securities laws is to uphold the principles of fairness

85

Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012). See also Legal Information Institute, supra note 21.
Legal Information Institute, supra note 21, at 1205.. (quoting Instructions to Form S-3, Item 11(a)). Note that those
entities filing Form S-3 prior to public offerings are of the sort not required to file more broadly available forms, such
as S-1 or S-K, and are therefore not required to include in its prospectus the information required under Item 303: the
disclosure of “any known trends or uncertainties that have had or that the registrant reasonably expects will have a
material favorable or unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or income from continuing operations.” Id. at 1225
n.9 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (2017)).
87
Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1204; 14 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii).
88
Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1200.
89
Id. at 1207 (citing Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994)
(“Together, the ‘33 Acts embrace a fundamental purpose . . . to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the
philosophy of caveat emptor.”)).
86
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and efficiency in the market.90 Coupled with the principles of fairness and efficiency is the notion
that the market must be able to correctly align a stock’s price with its “fundamental value.”91 The
court noted that the need for such reliable, firm-specific information is particularly strong within
the context of public offerings, where prospective investors must rely solely on what is presented
to them by the issuing entity, including stock price.92
In conclusion, the court noted that, although an issuing entity may have fully complied
with the periodic disclosure requirements of the ‘33 Act, there remains the possibility that other,
undisclosed facts may be material and, therefore, would have mandated disclosure. 93 While the
court did reject the notion that an issuing entity must disclose certain facts in every situation in
which its quarterly results may possibly be subpar and disappoint the market,94 it held that potential
investors deserve to have the most relevant and up-to-date information available to them before
making an investment decision. 95 In the case of Digital Equipment Corporation, the court
concluded that its third quarter results presented “more than a minor business fluctuation . . .
indicating some substantial likelihood that the quarter would turn out to be an extreme departure
from publicly known trends and uncertainties[.]”96
B.

Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc.
Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc. involved a dispute between stockholders who purchased stock

of Vivint Solar, Inc. during its initial public offering (IPO), in which the plaintiffs alleged violation
of sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the ‘33 Act.97 Relying on Shaw, the plaintiffs argued that Vivint

90

Id.
Id. at 1207–08 (citing Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 DUKE
L. J. 977, 988–89 (1992)).
92
Id. (citing Kahan, supra note 91, at 1014–15).
93
Id. at 1210.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1211.
97
Stadnick, 861 F.3d at 34.
91
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Solar was required to disclose its interim financial statements for its third quarter, ending one day
before its IPO, because it reflected an extreme departure from what was previously disclosed in
the registration statement.98
1. Factual Background
Vivint Solar is a residential solar energy system company that, at the time of its IPO, was
the second largest residential solar energy installer in the United States, possessing an 8% market
share in 2013 and a 9% market share in 2014.99 Vivint Solar, significantly, operates on a unique
business model, which is predicated on the continued ownership of the solar energy systems that
it installs.100 This business model allows Vivint Solar to benefit from various tax credits and
government incentives, which allows “[c]ustomers [to] pay no up-front costs and instead enter into
twenty-year leases by which they purchase solar energy in monthly payments at approximately
15% to 30% less than they would pay for utility-generated electricity.”101 Thus, Vivint Solar’s
monthly revenue is generated solely by these customer payments.102
Due to its business structure, Vivint Solar naturally incurs major up-front costs. 103
Consequently, Vivint Solar has perpetually operated at a loss.104 To account for this, Vivint Solar
uses an accounting system called Hypothetical Liquidation at Book Value (HLBV), which means
that a shareholder’s ownership in the company is valued according to the balance sheet’s asset
valuation for the company. 105 Thus, the court noted that “[d]ue to Vivint[] [Solar’s] business
model and HLBV method, the allocation of income (a net loss in each quarter during the relevant

98

Id.
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
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period) between shareholders and [outside investors] may vary substantially from one quarter to
the next depending upon (1) contributions by investors and (2) transfers of title to the funds that
provided the requisite capital.”106 Hence, when presented with the information concerning Vivint
Solar’s business model and accounting method, a prospective investor would have had to attempt
to make sense of this complicated mix of factors to predict the success of Vivint Solar in the event
that they choose to become stockholders. Indeed, this would have been an arduous task for any
investor that is not an institution.
In anticipation of its IPO on October 1, 2014, Vivint Solar, in accordance with SEC
regulations, issued a registration statement that included its financial statements for the preceding
six quarters.107 The Second Circuit noted that the registration statement would have indicated
overarching fluctuating net losses and even warned prospective investors of the potential impact
its business and accounting models could have on the company’s income allocation amongst
shareholders and outside investors.108 Vivint Solar sold 20.6 million shares of common stock
during its IPO, raising a total of $300.8 million in net proceeds.109
Stockholder turmoil, however, began forty days later when Vivint Solar released its third
quarter financial statements, indicating that outside investor-attributable net loss decreased by
$28.6 million, which substantially contributed to the decreased shareholder net income: a $40.8
million decrease, to be exact.110 Accordingly, earnings per share fell to negative $0.45, which
missed the mark of analysts’ projections by 143%.111 This naturally caused a decrease in Vivint
Solar’s stock price, which ultimately fell 22.5% to $11.42 per share.112
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2. The Court’s Reasoning
The court began by analyzing what the applicable test for determining the materiality of
omitted interim financial information should be in the Second Circuit.113 It concluded that it
should be the total mix test, based on DeMaria v. Andersen, decided by the Second Circuit in
2003.114 The following subsection analyzes the Second Circuit’s decision in DeMaria, which
adopted and set forth the total mix test.115
DeMaria v. Andersen concerned facts highly similar to those of Shaw and Stadnick. In
DeMaria, plaintiffs argued that the issuing entity—ILife—failed to include in its registration
statement financial information for its first quarter, which ended at the end of March, the same
month in which ILife filed its registration statement with the SEC.116 In arriving at its conclusion,
the Second Circuit compared the situation in DeMaria to a case in which an issuing entity’s
disclosure consists of both accurate and inaccurate information. 117 In essence, a registration
statement that does not include interim financial information is, in fact, both accurate and
inaccurate. It is accurate in the sense that it provides all of the publicly available relevant financial
information that it was required to disclose under SEC regulations; At the same time, it is
inaccurate because other information exists and is known to the issuer that would change the results
of the public information disclosed in the registration statement. The Second Circuit relied on the
Supreme Court’s guidance in cautioning that “not every mixture with the true will neutralize the
deceptive. If it would take a financial analyst to spot the tension between the one and the other,
whatever is misleading will remain materially so, and liability should follow.”118
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Following that line of reasoning, the Second Circuit chose to utilize the test outlined by the
Supreme Court in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.—the total mix test.119 In TSC, however,
the Court was not addressing an alleged section 11 violation.120 Rather, the Court was presented
with an alleged violation of section 14(a) of The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (‘34 Act) in
TSC.121 As will be discussed at the end of this section, this comparison is not particularly sound.
Nonetheless, the Second Circuit applied the total mix test in DeMaria because the Supreme Court
had used the test to determine the materiality of omitted information—although not necessarily in
the same context—in TSC.122
3. Returning to the Court’s Reasoning in Stadnick
The Second Circuit, in Stadnick applied the same—and, as will be argued, flawed—
reasoning for applying the total mix test, stating that “DeMaria rests upon the classic materiality
standard in the omission context[] with which [the court] and most other courts are familiar.” 123
In further explaining its reasoning, the court noted that the extreme departure test applied in Shaw
was too volatile and left too many questions open—such as metrics, the role of the reasonable
investor, etc.—in determining whether an extreme departure had taken place.124 This argument
will be discussed further in Parts IV and V.
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In the case of Vivint Solar, however, the Second Circuit concluded that the company’s
registration statement included ample warnings for a prospective investor to conclude that such a
result was possible.125 The court was also not convinced that a reasonable investor would have
considered the omission material where it was privy to the information concerning Vivint Solar’s
peculiar business model and accounting method.126
C.

Summarizing the Split
In choosing to apply the total mix test, the Second Circuit turned to the Supreme Court’s

use of the test in the context of omissions. 127 The notable difference between the cases that
DeMaria cites to in support of its adoption of the total mix test, however, are factually dissimilar
to DeMaria and to Shaw and Stadnick.128 The cited cases involved violations of the ‘34 Act,129
whereas DeMaria and Stadnick alleged violations of section 11 of the ‘33 Act.130 The position of
the plaintiffs in the ‘34 Act cases131 and the position of the plaintiffs in the section 11 cases132 are
significantly different, especially when considering the sentiments underlying corporate law
theory.
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The very dynamic of a publicly traded corporation underlines why shareholders deserve
the most relevant information when deciding on whether to invest in a particular company. Unless
a shareholder owns shares in a closely-held corporation, his or her management role is slim.133
Individually, a shareholder has an even less significant role in the corporation. 134 Notably, a
shareholder has no vote on matters that are fundamental to the company’s success: i.e., deciding
on whether to issue more stock, deciding on whether to relocate the company’s operations,
deciding on whether its CEO should be replaced, and deciding on most other day-to-day operations
of the company.135 In that regard, holding a company’s omissions to a lower standard with respect
to shareholder disclosure claims makes sense, as it is in line with the understood, and wellestablished corporate management scheme. Holding omissions to a lower standard in section 11
cases where potential investors are involved is concerning, however, because of the limited
decision-making role that they would have as actual shareholders if they did, in fact, choose to
purchase shares. Hence, deciding on whether to invest in a particular company is an important
decision that potential investors must make as they are essentially placing their trust in that
company to make the best business decisions and to operate in an efficient and profitable manner.
There is also a fundamental difference in actions arising under the ‘33 Act and the ‘34 Act.
The ‘34 Act governs after an investor has already made the decision to invest in a company.136
The investor has already been convinced that he or she is investing in a good company and has
already placed his or her trust in the company’s management. At this time, after an investor has
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become a shareholder, fiduciary duties come into place. 137 Thus, a shareholder has recourse
against director action that potentially was not in the best interest of the company. 138 These
fiduciary duties, including the duty to disclose, are not present when there is no relationship
between a company and its prospective investors.139 Thus, it is even more important for a higher
standard to be applied in the omission context where an issuing entity is not bound by any fiduciary
duties and an investor, therefore, has no recourse other than section 11.
Accordingly, this Comment argues that the Second Circuit, first in DeMaria and later in
Stadnick, incorrectly ignored the unique context in which section 11 claims are brought compared
to the context in which the total mix test has historically been used—in cases arising under the ‘34
Act. In light of the lack of fiduciary duties present at the time of a public offering, a higher standard
for evaluating the materiality of omissions must be used. As will be subsequently discussed, the
extreme departure test represents that higher standard.
IV.

Policy Implications

This Part presents the policy implications supporting the use of the extreme departure test
for omissions in the public offering context. As discussed infra in Part III, the lack of fiduciary
duties and the importance of the public offering render it necessary to employ a higher standard in
evaluating the materiality of omissions. This must be reconciled with well-established law that
“[a] duty to disclose ‘does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market
information.’”140 Thus, this section seeks to reconcile the lack of fiduciary duties, particularly the

SJOSTROM, JR., supra note 133, at 429 (“corporate law imposes two broad fiduciary duties on directors: the duty
of care and the duty of loyalty.”).
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lack of a duty to disclose, with the implementation of a higher materiality standard for omissions
in the context of public offerings.
A.

The Insider Trader vs. The Institutional Trader
The Supreme Court, in Chiarella v. United States, endorsed the notion of the disclose or

abstain rule, which would require corporate insiders to “disclose material facts which are known
to them by virtue of their position but which are not known to persons with whom they deal and
which, if known, would affect their investment judgment.” 141 Issuing entities too may be
considered insider traders. 142 How is it, then, that an issuing entity in possession of interim
financial data that may sway potential investors’ opinions of its company is not held to the same
abstain or disclose rule, when it is on the brink of a public offering?
Marcel Kahan argues that the disclose or abstain rule, along with other disclosure
requirements, may promote the release of a greater quantity of information and more reliable
information.143 This would, in turn, facilitate a more accurate assessment of stock prices that more
closely relate to the stock’s fundamental value. 144 In effect, the extreme departure test is an
extension of the disclose or abstain rule—it promotes essentially the same thing: disclosure where
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the need to do so is vague or abstaining from issuing shares until that information has been timely
released to the public.
While imposing the disclose or abstain rule on issuing entities is virtually impossible due
to the lack of any fiduciary duties owed by the issuing entity to the prospective investor,145 the
public offering market should be a level playing field, just as the corporate repurchasing market
is.146 The extreme departure test proposes a legitimate and viable solution to this issue. The test
would not, in effect, pressure issuing entities to disclose all, or even a large portion, of the interim
information—financial or otherwise—to prospective investors. Rather, issuing entities would be
forced to disclose any interim information that they possess that would present an extreme
departure from any known trends or uncertainties. By definition, “extreme” signifies that the
information would have to be “of the character or kind farthest removed from the ordinary[.]”147
Thus, information that would indicate a slight stray from known trends or uncertainties—i.e.,
normal business fluctuations—would not meet this standard for materiality and may be omitted
without incurring liability. Only information that is significantly beyond what would be expected
would rise to the “extreme departure” level. Thus, uncertainty regarding whether such information
would be “of the character or kind farthest removed from the ordinary”148 would arise in cases
where the information is either extreme or near extreme. The disclose or abstain rule would thus
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be effectuated because issuing entities could face potential section 11 liability. Normal business
fluctuations naturally would not fall under this category of information, as they inherently cannot
be considered extreme or even approaching extreme.
B.

Who Are Reasonable Investors, Actually?
Another important policy implication to consider is the perspective of the reasonable

investor. Both the extreme departure and the total mix tests seek to determine whether an omission
would be material to the reasonable investor. Therefore, the better test would be able to account
for the actual ability of the reasonable investor to consider the information that he or she is
presented with in the prospectus and registration statement and predict the company’s future
performance. This section is meant to address the question posed by the Second Circuit in Stadnick
regarding the implementation of the extreme departure test: namely, what is “the precise role of
the familiar ‘objectively reasonable investor’ in assessing whether a departure is extreme[.]”149
In a perfect world, the total mix test would be sufficient in catering to the needs of the
reasonable investor.150 But when one looks to the reality of who the actual investor is, it is quite
evident that there exists a significant disparity in terms of the reasonable investor recognized by
the law and the average investor that exists in real life.151 A 2012 SEC study found that the average
American investor did not possess basic financial literacy and thus did not have the ability or the
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necessary knowledge to safeguard him or herself from being a victim of securities fraud.152 Prime
examples of this lack of financial literacy and ability to safeguard against fraud are the 2008
financial crisis and the dot-com bubble.153 In the financial crisis, there is evidence that many of
the defaulting borrowers who were issued subprime mortgages did not understand the borrowing
terms and the complex payment structures attached to their mortgages and, in actuality, could not
afford the incrementally-increasing payments.154 Even more concerning is the case of the dot-com
bubble, where investors would jump at the opportunity to purchase securities even remotely
concerning the Internet and would fail to consider other, more relevant factors, such as stock
valuation.155 In fact, research has shown that there are many other factors that determine whether
a prospective investor will choose to invest in a company other than his or her rational evaluation
of that company’s ability to perform. Tom C.W. Lin notes the following:
Many investors, for instance, are motivated by irrelevant factors like sunlight,
weather, and sleep when making investment decisions. Irrational investors also
chase fads and exhibit herd mentality with their investments. Additionally,
irrational investors frequently possess perilous amounts of optimism, confidence,
and loss aversion that diminish their capacity to make the best investment
decisions.156
Accordingly, courts should not be as confident that the reasonable investor is actually reasonable.
While there is a strong legal tradition in utilizing the reasonable person standard, there exists risk
in relying on the reasonable investor standard in creating judicial tests in the financial context
Lin, supra note 150, at 469 (citing OFFICE OF INVESTOR EDUC. & ADVOCACY, SEC. & EXCH., COMM’N, STUDY
REGARDING FINANCIAL LITERACY AMONG INVESTORS 15 (2012)).
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because of the market consequences that potentially may occur and, historically, have regularly
occurred.
Applying the actual reasonable investor standard to facts similar to those of Shaw and,
particularly, Stadnick is a daunting task. The term “actual reasonable investor” refers to the typical
investor who, according to Lin, lacks financial literacy, is vulnerable to trends, and often acts on
impulse or other external motivators. 157 Shaw presented investors with a tricky analytical situation
in which predictions concerning the company’s profitability and future success could have gone
either way. Stadnick, however, presented investors with information that was difficult to digest
and analyze. Although, in theory, the information was present for prospective investors to make
an accurate prediction of Vivint Solar’s future success, an actual reasonable investor would not
have been able to easily interpret the effects of its complex accounting methods combined with
front-loaded losses. As such, the total mix of information available to investors would be assessed
differently depending on the investor’s level of financial sophistication. An institutional investor
would have been able to see, from the total mix of information available, that there was a real risk
of loss. But an individual who trades from an online brokerage account likely would not be able
to arrive at the same prediction because he or she would lack the perspective to adequately analyze
the total mix of information available to him or her.158
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Assessing the materiality of an omission should account for the disparity of investors’
intelligence and sophistication along with the resources available at their disposal. The total mix
test does not recognize this disparity. Because the reasonable investor standard is calibrated more
toward an institutional investor, this standard would basically render an omission material only if
an institutional investor would have seen the omitted information as altering the total mix of their
forecasted conclusions concerning the company’s performance abilities.

The total mix of

information that an actual investor would garner from that same information is lacking due to the
inability of an actual investor to fully understand, comprehend, and analyze such information.159
Accordingly, a higher standard must be utilized so as to account for this disparity. The extreme
departure test would be capable of doing so because it would ensure that the omitted material was
presented to prospective investors in more cases than would the total mix test.160
V.

Conclusion

This Comment has argued that the applicable test to be applied in determining the
materiality of an omission in the public offering context should be the extreme departure test.
While the total mix test may be appropriate in determining the materiality of other omissions or
information generally, the peculiarity of the public offering context warrants the imposition of a
higher materiality standard. Furthermore, the implementation of the extreme departure test would
result in disclosure in more cases than the total mix test, thus implementing a quasi-disclose-or-
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abstain rule on issuing entities offering shares through a public offering. It would also reduce the
advantage of institutional investors over individual investors—an advantage that is due to the
disparity in financial literacy, sophistication, and resources between the two groups. Additionally,
it would work hand-in-hand with the pull of the market in attempting to ensure that stock valuation
best matches fundamental value.
Like the total mix test, the extreme departure test still safeguards the issuing entity from
the threat of overwhelming liability. The extreme departure test would only mandate disclosure
when the omitted information would cause an extreme or near extreme departure from a known
trend or risk. Although more case law would have to be developed to refine the terms of what
would define an extreme departure, issuing entities still have clarity in their obligations: extreme
is a “fairly significant departure,”161 and the step below extreme would be a somewhat significant
departure. Thus, disclosure would be necessary only in cases that depart from regular business
fluctuations while still mandating more disclosure than the total mix test.162
It is necessary to note, however, that courts would still need to determine the metrics for
determining an extreme departure.163 Metrics for determining an extreme departure are very much
dependent on the facts of each particular case. What constitutes an extreme departure for one
issuing entity may not be an extreme departure for another issuing entity. Even in light of the factsensitive inquiry that must take place in applying the extreme departure test and the uncertainty
that this may present issuing entities, it cannot be concluded that the extreme departure test would
have negative implications on equity and fairness.
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Not only will investors benefit from a higher materiality standard in the context of public
offerings, but so too will the market. Stock prices are often incongruent with their fundamental
value because of one or more of the following reasons: “lack of information, misassessment of
information, speculative trading, and liquidity crunches.”164 The first three reasons are implicated
by the omissions of the sort in Shaw and Stadnick. Hence, a materiality standard that induces
issuing entities to disclose more information would benefit the market by ensuring that stock prices
are more accurate.
The focus then shifts to enforcement. The ability of courts, or even the SEC, to enforce
such disclosure requirements is often doubted.165 While courts and the SEC may undoubtedly play
a role in enforcement, it is the market itself that has the ability to force compliance with the
disclosures required under the extreme departure test.166 And, indeed, the market has a reason to
force compliance because of its inherent struggle to achieve equality. Therefore, the extreme
departure test is courts’ best attempt to implement a disclosure obligation that complements the
market’s disclosure demands. Together, the two may react to decrease the disparity between an
issuing entity’s stock valuation and that stock’s fundamental value.
In a society still recovering from the latest financial crisis, courts must take responsibility
in strengthening the statutory safeguards in place so as to avoid the perils of the past. What the
market and investors need is transparency. What the issuing entities need is a stronger market with
more investors. Adopting the extreme departure test in the context of omissions in the context of
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Kahan, supra note 91, at 988.
“[C]ompanies and their lawyers will no doubt ask: (1) Does this new duty mean that when we do offerings we will
have an affirmative duty to collect our intraquarterly information and examine it to see whether or not it is material?
(2) What if we, for internal cost-related reasons, do not collect and evaluate information until the quarter is over? (3)
Does this obligation apply only to end-of-quarter offerings? (4) Are we exempt if we time our offerings to be at the
beginning of a quarter?” Mitu Gulati, supra note 145, at 729 (1999).
166
See id. at 690 (“Because the market itself disciplines firms, through the imposition of nonlegal sanctions such as
reputational costs, the creation of legal sanctions is largely unnecessary to force appropriate disclosures and, in fact,
is positively detrimental to a well-functioning market—witness the phenomenon of frivolous ‘strike suits.’”).
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public offerings has the potential to benefit all parties with proper implementation. The total mix
of information points to the overwhelming benefit of the extreme departure test.
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